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Populism is a topic that has been widely studied over the past decades but mostly from a 
political perspective. These contributions mainly focus on the analysis of populism as a (socio) 
political phenomenon placed in a historical, global context. A second field of interest covers the 
mass appeal of populist parties. The latter is not only a timely, highly relevant issue right now 
but also sheds light on the flaws of liberal democracy. 
While a lot of academic effort has been put into defining populism and explaining the reasons 
for its success, the underlying cultural beliefs on which populist ‘us and them” dichotomies are 
based remain unclear. We shall therefore come up with a typology of culture and populism. This 
typology will reveal how various aspects of culture (such as popular culture, cultural images, 
and literary works) are prevalent in the populist construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’. 
Based on examples from France and The Netherlands (two countries with major right-wing populist 
parties), the typology will differentiate between sociofacts, mentifacts and artifacts (cf. Huxley), and 
their use and appropriation by populist actors. The artifacts category comprises what I call ‘organic 
authors’ and ‘appropriated authors’, a terminology borrowed from Gramsci. The difference between 
the two, as will be shown, is the author’s identification with and articulation of certain kinds of ideas.
Keywords: cultural studies, populism, cultural identity, France, The Netherlands.




Corresponding author: J.F. (Judith) Jansma, Faculty of Arts. European Literature and Culture-Centre Arts in Society. Oude Kijk 
in’t Jatstraat, 26. 9712 EK Groningen (Holand). 
Suggested citation: Jansma J. (2019). Culture in the Name of the People? Towards a typology of populism and culture. Debats. 
Journal on Culture, Power and Society, 4, 119-132. DOI: http://doi.org/10.28939/iam.debats-en.2019-10
INTRODUCTION
“If you believe that you are a citizen of the world, you 
are a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what 
citizenship means”. This famous statement made by 
Theresa May shortly after the Brexit vote1 exemplifies 
 1 Theresa May’s conference speech in full : https://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/05/theresa-mays-
conference-speech-in-full/
the centrality of cultural identity in contemporary 
politics. The notion and alleged importance of the 
culturally-grounded national identity has made a 
strong come-back in today’s political discourse, not 
only among the parties of the populist right, but 
also on a much broader scale. For instance, in their 
manifesto for the 2017 General Election, the Dutch 
Christian-Democratic Party (CDA) insisted that chil-
dren should learn the Dutch national anthem and its 
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history at school. This policy was incorporated in the 
final agreement of the coalition government, of which 
CDA is part. Hence, it can be said that adherence to a 
national identity is presented as a way of dealing with 
complex societal challenges such as multiculturalism 
and globalisation. 
At the same time, culture is also used to convey a 
political standpoint. A good example is PVV leader 
Geert Wilders2’s recent attempt to set up a Muhammad 
cartoon competition, which was cancelled after mass 
demonstrations in Muslim countries, most notably in 
Pakistan. It is clear that in this case the aim was not 
to celebrate culture through artistic expression but 
rather to use it as a political stick to stir up a hornets’ 
nest, for it is well known that Muslims consider picto-
rial representations of The Prophet as blasphemous. 
Wilders admitted that he cancelled the competition 
to protect Dutch citizens from the wrath of Muslims, 
whom he considers to be violent and intolerant. 
Culture and politics are a fruitful combination, as 
culture is key in building a feeling of community 
within a geopolitically-defined space (the nation). 
Following Anderson (2016), the nation should be 
considered “an imagined political community”, in 
which a group too large for all members to know 
each other still experiences a bond, a “horizontal 
comradeship” primarily based on a common culture. 
As we have seen in the examples above, culture can 
be a set of common values and traditions that help 
define who ‘we” are but it can also be used to stir up 
hostility towards ‘others”. This approach fosters a po-
litical worldview, with culture being used to underline 
a given political agenda. 
This paper will propose a framework for understanding 
the role that culture plays in contemporary politics by 
focusing on populist parties. Having a strong ‘us and 
 2 Geert Wilders is the leader of the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid 
(Freedom Party), a far-right populist party established in 2005. 
Wilders is particularly known for his anti-Islam discourse, for 
which he has been tried several times. In 2016 he was found 
guilty of incitement to discrimination and hatred targeting 
Dutch citizens of Moroccan decent. 
them” narrative, in which society is split into ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’, is largely built upon a cultural understanding 
of a common identity. Following Rensmann (2017), I 
will argue that this notion of a culturally-based identity 
is strongly articulated by populist parties. That is why 
I will analyse the ways in which populists explicitly 
use culture. This will follow a brief introduction on 
populism and its dichotomies. 
Given that culture is a fairly broad concept, I shall 
propose a typology covering the various kinds of 
culture and their use by populists. This can range 
from cultural images and symbols — a more folkloric 
interpretation of culture — to the use and appropria-
tion of cultural works such as literature, cinema and 
art. This approach — as advocated by Rensmann 
(2017) — should shed light on populism as a mostly 
cultural, authoritarian reaction to modern society. 
After the first, more general part in which I define 
populism, the scope will be narrowed down to the 
contexts of France and The Netherlands. These two 
countries have sizeable populist parties, which closely 
work together as allies in the European Parliament. 
Being opposed to (further) European integration and 
immigration, these parties strongly defend national 
sovereignty and identity, and, for this reason, provide 
interesting case studies.
WHAT IS POPULISM? 
If 2016 marked the global breakthrough of populism, 
with the Brexit vote in June and Donald Trump’s elec-
tion in November, the populist storm does not seem 
to have abated. The so-called ‘Patriotic Spring’ of 2017 
temporarily halted in France and The Netherlands, 
although both the Front National (FN) and the Partij 
voor de Vrijheid (PVV) still ended second during their 
respective presidential and legislative elections. A 
populist ‘Autumn Storm’ reached Germany in Sep-
tember 2017, where Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) 
was the first nationalist far-right party to win seats 
in the Reichstag/Bundestag since World War II. Only 
one month later almost 26% of the Austrian electorate 
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voted for the right-wing populist Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (FPÖ), which is now part of Austria’s coali-
tion. In 2018, several European countries experienced 
a spate of populist electoral gains, most notably in 
Italy, Hungary, Slovenia and Sweden. Outside Europe, 
there was the widely disputed re-election of president 
Maduro in Venezuela, followed by the election of 
Bolsonaro in Brazil later that year. In other words, 
it is clear that populism is still a political force to be 
reckoned with both in Europe and beyond.
The rise of populism has also attracted considerable 
scholarly interest, as shown by the number of 
recent contributions on the topic, most notably the 
publication of Mudde and Kaltwasser’s Populism, A 
Very Short Introduction in 2017. Most scholars try to 
define what populism is, given that the word is used 
to describe very broad political phenomena in widely-
scattered geographical areas embodying different 
political traditions (ranging from Latin American left-
wing presidents to European far-right parties) (Mudde 
and Kaltwasser 2017). Consequently, there seems to be 
little consensus on whether populism is an ideology, 
a movement, a political style or a discourse. For the 
purpose of this paper, I will stick to Mudde’s (2004) 
minimalist definition of populism, which takes into 
account the core concepts that all populisms share, 
while at the same time acknowledging the various 
forms these movements take. Mudde and Kaltwasser 
(2017: 6) define populism as follows:
Populism is a thin-centred ideology that considers 
society to be ultimately separated into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic camps, the ‘pure 
people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues 
that politics should be an expression of ‘The 
People’s Will’.
This definition, or ideational approach, sees populism 
as a ‘thin-centred’ ideology, in contrast to a ‘full’ ide-
ology, meaning that it can be combined with other 
ideologies. If populism determines the presence of 
the three core concepts, the ‘host-ideologies’ define 
the way in which they are interpreted. For example, 
if populism is merged with Socialism, being part of 
the people or the elite is mostly a socio-economic 
question, as we see for example in countries such 
as Venezuela and Bolivia, or in Europe in left-wing 
populist parties such as Podemos in Spain and Syriza 
in Greece. On the other hand, when populism is 
combined with nativism, the people is constituted 
on an ethnic base, for example the ‘real’ French, 
Hungarians or Americans, excluding minorities such 
as Roma (gypsy) or (Muslim) immigrants. 
Another much debated issue is why people vote for 
populist parties, and, more specifically, what has 
encouraged them to do so in such large numbers 
now. As argued by Laclau in his influential work On 
Populist Reason (2005), populism emerges when there 
is a “multiplication of social demands”. However, 
these social demands, or “neglected concerns” (Judis 
2016) are numerous and are therefore often catego-
rised in terms of society’s existing social and cultural 
fault lines (Kriesi et al. 2006, Rensmann 2017, Rodrik 
2017). In general, one can say that populist voters 
revolt against the establishment because they have a 
burning sense of injustice or feel that their way of life 
is threatened. That said, the precise nature of these 
(perceived) challenges may differ among countries, 
regions and probably even among individuals. 
The populist worldview simplifies a complex reality, 
explaining the problems of an imagined homogene-
ous people by blaming the elite and by scape-goating 
the ‘others’. This idea of antagonism is key to theories 
on populism, resulting in horizontal and vertical di-
chotomies (Rensmann 2017). The vertical dichotomy 
— between the people and the elite — is an essential 
part of populism. Populists argue that the elite (which 
can be a political, economic, or cultural one) is alien-
ated from the ordinary folk (Rooduijn et al. 2016), 
and therefore does not represent the people anymore. 
This, according to the populist view, is the world 
upside down; the idea of popular sovereignty imply-
ing that the will of the people or general will should 
be decisive. In her 2017 campaign video3, Marine Le 
Pen, leader of the French far-right party Front National, 
 3 Clip from Marine Le Pen’s official campaign: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=FYWnuQc5mYA
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illustrates this antagonism when telling her audience 
that the choice they will be making for the elections 
is crucial, in her own words, “un choix de civilisation” 
[a choice of civilisation]. Either they continue “(...) 
with those who lied, failed, betrayed, who misled the 
people and who lost France”, or they decide “(...) to 
put France back in order”. The slogan of the campaign 
being “Au nom du peuple” [In The People’s Name]. It 
is not hard to guess who those liars and traitors are, 
and why the French people need Marine Le Pen for 
France to be “independent, respected, prospering, 
proud, sustainable and just”.
As well as setting the people against the elites, most 
populists tend to exclude an ‘other’ from being 
part of the people. This mechanism is referred to as 
the “horizontal dichotomy” (Rensmann 2017) or 
“exclusionism” (Rooduijn et al. 2014). While some 
scholars argue that this exclusion of a dangerous 
‘other’ is purely a characteristic of right-wing 
populism (Judis 2016, Mudde 2013, Rooduijn et al. 
2014), Rensmann (2017: 126) disagrees and states 
that this exclusionary discourse is also found in 
populist parties that are generally classified as left-
wing. Here, he points to the German Die Linke and 
La France Insoumise which – although being situated 
at the (far) left of the political spectrum – do openly 
defend a nationalist agenda. He adds that the left-
right classification is the wrong tool for typifying 
the various kinds of populism, and suggests that we 
look at other aspects:
Despite their cross-national distinctions, however, 
all ‘right-wing’ and most ‘left-wing’  populist 
actors share key common ideological denominators 
shaped by authoritarianism, anti-liberal, anti-
pluralistic vertical and horizontal dichotomies, 
which implicitly or explicitly endorse cultural 
exclusivity, identity and denigration of ‘others’. 
In other words, and to come back to Mudde’s (2004) 
definition of populism as a thin-centred ideology, 
whether a populist party is left-wing or right-wing 
does not determine their adoption or rejection of 
nativist ideas. Actually, the mere fact that populism 
aims at an imagined homogeneous people suggests that 
some sort of exclusion is inherent in the populist view 
given that such homogeneous peoples are a figment 
of the imagination and are thus created by excluding 
members that look different or behave differently. 
Like the vertical dichotomy (in which populists stress 
the gap between the people and the elite, and, im-
portantly, also the elite’s unwillingness to narrow 
it), the horizontal dichotomy is also multi-layered. 
According to populist ideas, the ‘other’ constitutes a 
serious threat to the imagined homogeneous people, 
implying that ‘the people’ is morally good and the 
‘other’ inherently evil. It is also important to note 
that the ‘other’ is projected as a homogeneous entity, 
just like ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. Evidently, this 
homogenisation of the ‘other’ is highly problematic, 
especially when talking about groups such as ‘im-
migrants’ or ‘refugees’, which obviously comprise 
people from varying nationalities, religions, socio-
economic backgrounds and education. By defining 
an out-group, a self-group is formed on the basis of 
a dichotomy: ‘they are lazy immigrants’ versus ‘we 
are hard workers’. Excluding the other helps thus to 
build one’s own (national) identity (cf. Wodak 2015).
My assumption is that this double ‘us and them’ 
mechanism (which is a feature of the populist mind 
set) builds upon and contributes to a cultural under-
standing of the people’s common identity. That is why 
this paper will focus on the links between populism 
and culture. Often thought to be mutually exclusive 
(populism dismisses culture as a waste of time and 
money, while culture perceives and represents pop-
ulism as its disturbing ‘other’), I will argue that things 
are much more complex. The next section will give 
an overview of (recent) scholarly contributions on the 
topic of populism and culture, after which I will focus 
on the use and appropriation of culture by populists. 
POPULISM AND CULTURE
In 2006, Kriesi et al. mentioned the prevalence of 
cultural factors over economic ones in the populist 
right’s agenda, and in recent academic contributions 
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this idea has taken root. In their paper, Kriesi et al. 
(2006) conclude that “parties of the populist right do 
not stand out for their economic profile” and that “it 
is on cultural issues where they support a demarcation 
strategy much more strongly than (untransformed) 
mainstream parties”. Focusing on the populist right, 
they claim that this emphasis on cultural issues is a 
much more powerful way of uniting a large group of 
disillusioned people from widely differing economic 
groups. 
This idea of both an economic and a cultural cleavage 
is also present in Rodrik (2017), who splits people into 
the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalisation. If the former 
is a characteristic of left-wing populism, in which the 
schism between working class and (financial) elites is 
accentuated, the latter exploits the cultural gap based 
on the identity of the ‘people’ versus outside groups 
such as immigrants and technocratic institutions (EU), 
raising the spectre new ‘competitors’. The division 
between economic and cultural factors explaining 
the populist vote can also be found in Gidron and 
Hall (2017: 6), who look at the populist right. Taking 
one’s ‘subjective social status’ as their main focus, they 
assume that both socio-economic developments as 
well as new cultural frameworks (i.e. multiculturalism, 
gender equality) make many feel that they are no 
longer respected and recognised by society. Also 
Goodhart’s (2017: 9) distinction between ‘Somewheres’ 
and ‘Anywheres’ points to ordinary people’s feeling 
of inferiority in comparison with others (the elite). 
He claims that mainly cultural values lie at the heart 
of the dissent stemming from this: 
Their appeal [i.e. of populist politics] is primarily 
motivated by cultural anxiety and hard-to-measure 
psychological loss. Economic loss is a factor too — 
a significant majority of the 56 per cent of British 
people who describe themselves as ‘have-nots’ 
voted Brexit but if it [the Referendum] had been 
primarily about economic loss, the populists of 
the left would surely have been stronger.
These different sets of cultural values (progressive 
versus conservative) provoke cultural clashes; a “cul-
tural backlash” (Inglehart and Norris 2016), “culture 
wars” (Furedi 2018, Nagle 2017), or in Rensmann’s 
(2017) words, a “cultural counter-revolution”. As 
such, populism speaks to the people whose voices 
once belonged to the dominant cultural normative 
discourse but that are now overruled by those advo-
cating progressive social values.
The cultural clash can also take place on an inter-
national level. Furedi (2018) describes “conflicting 
attitudes towards cultural values” between Hungary, 
led by a conservative right-wing populist party, and 
the EU. At the same time, many Western European 
populist parties have a strong tendency to contrast ‘our’ 
modern Western values to those of the ‘other’, usually 
an Islamic culture, considered backward (Brubaker 
2017, Moffitt 2017). An “Identitarian Christianism” 
is defended, a common Western European ‘culture’ 
which includes liberal progressive values such as gen-
der equality, gay rights, secularism and freedom of 
speech versus the allegedly intolerant Islam. These 
examples clearly show that culture is an essential 
tool for mobilising people, playing on the people’s 
discontent with changing cultural values. 
The term ‘populism’ also appears in the Cultural Stud-
ies field, most notably in relation to popular culture. 
McGuigan (1992: 4) invokes the notion of “cultural 
populism”, seeking to underline the importance of 
studying the symbolic experiences and practices of 
ordinary people in contrast to ‘culture with a capital 
C”. A parallel can be seen between this neo-Gramscian 
conception of cultural studies and the vertical di-
chotomy of the people opposed to the elite. Here, it 
is worth mentioning the literary phenomenon of le 
roman populiste in early 1930s France, (Paveau 1998). 
According to the authors of the two manifestos, Thérive 
and Lemonnier, people should have a central place 
in the narrative: “one should depict the little people, 
the mediocre people, who are the mass of the society, 
and whose lives also have their dramas” (Lemonnier 
1930, quoted in Paveau 1998: 48). 
More recently, Bax (2016) adopted the term “literary 
populist” to describe the work of Dutch novelist Leon 
de Winter, who uses populist rhetoric to position 
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himself both as a public intellectual and a literary 
celebrity. The public intellectual writes columns for 
newspapers and is invited to talk shows as a political 
commentator. By contrast, the literary celebrity seeks 
commercial success, writing books that are no more 
than entertainment. Supported by his reading public 
(the people) and denounced by literary critics (the 
elite), Bax writings echo the discourse and rhetoric of 
populist politicians — something that is also reflected 
in De Winter’s political novels. 
All three authors share this wish to identify with 
the people and their way of life because they see 
them as more ‘authentic’. However, while using the 
term ‘populism’, it should be made clear that this 
interpretation of populism does not follow Mudde’s 
(2014) definition of the phenomenon (cf. above) but 
rather merely highlights some of its key aspects. In 
the case of the roman populiste, the emphasis is on 
the people — a borrowing from the Russian narodniki 
(populists) in the late 19th/early 20th century. Bax, on 
the other hand, focuses on the populist rhetorical tools 
of simplification and polarisation that are part and 
parcel of De Winter’s oeuvre. This indicates the extent 
to which populism has become an ambiguous term, 
used across different disciplines, and reminds us that 
we should be aware of its diverse uses and meanings. 
Rather than echoing a political phenomenon, culture 
can sometimes help us understand or reflect on com-
plex (political) realities and the cultural values at stake. 
Here, the so-called ‘Trump bump’ comes to mind, that 
is, the sudden popularity of certain dystopian novels 
after Donald Trump’s election as President of The 
United States. Shaw (2018) and Rau (2018) examine 
the appearance of a new literary genre of post-Brexit 
novels (BrexLit) and the lessons to be learnt from 
them. In a similar vein, according to Berg-Sørensen 
(2017), culture can serve as a “diagnosis of a current 
ideological crisis in European democratic culture”. 
Working on the controversial novel Soumission (2015: 
143) by Houellebecq, he notes that the author uses 
satire to “expose, mock, make us laugh, unmask, and, 
thus, criticise those in power and with authority.”. 
In sum, we have seen that culture and populism are 
studied in relation to each other, but that there are 
different ways to do so. The most frequent link is the 
cultural discontent fuelling the success of populism. 
Rather less studied are the parallels between populism 
and popular culture, and the role of culture and lit-
erature as a way to critically reflect on the world. 
However, the use of culture made by populists has 
received scant attention. An earlier case study revealed 
that the novel Soumission was held up by members 
of the Front National and right-wing journalists as a 
dire warning and to urge their audiences to vote for 
a way out (Jansma 2018). The following section will 
draw up a typology of populism and culture to give 
a clearer picture of how populist parties appropriate 
culture for their own ends. 
TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF POPULISM AND CULTURE
Before moving on to analysing the populist cultural 
narrative, one should reflect on the notion of culture 
and in particular on the ways it can provide a useful 
tool for populists. Following Hall (1986: 26), culture 
includes “the actual grounded terrain of practices, 
representations, languages and customs of any spe-
cific society. I also mean the contradictory forms of 
“common sense” which have taken root and helped 
to shape popular life.”. This anthropological approach 
implies that culture is a system of “shared social mean-
ings” (Barker 2000: 8), as opposed to the concept of 
‘Culture with a capital C’ (cf. Leavisism). This latter 
(elitist) interpretation of culture sees it as “the best 
that has been thought and said in the world” (Arnold 
1960, quoted in Barker 2000: 36). In other words, the 
opposition between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture bears on 
whether culture is seen as “the high point in civiliza-
tion” (Barker 2000: 36), or the product of ordinary life. 
Traditionally, three types of culture can be distinguished 
(Barker 2000, McGuigan 1992, Nachbar and Lause 
1996): elite culture, popular culture and folk culture. 
Whereas the latter is an oral transmission of artifacts 
— including legends and family recipes — within a 
limited community (family, friends), the other two 
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are of a more public nature. The main difference 
between popular and elite culture, according to 
Nachbar and Lause (1996: 16), is that the former is 
produced on a large scale and that it aims to reach a 
mass audience. Elite culture, on the other hand, targets 
a more exclusive audience, having specific interests or 
knowledge. The authors stress their conviction that 
intelligence and wealth are not essential ingredients 
for elite culture: 
“Elite” is specialised and limited to those interested 
enough to learn the specific knowledge needed, 
but not merely the culture of the rich and 
intellectual. 
Evidently, this distinction between folk, popular and 
elite culture is a blurred one.. A director of an Art 
film will try to sell as many tickets as he can. A Bach 
fan would probably need to hear a lot of pop music 
before he could appreciate it, and vice-versa. This 
shows the inherent limitations of trying to pigeon-
hole the complex concept of culture into clear-cut 
(hierarchical) categories, and explains the endless 
argument about what constitutes art. Although this 
classification of culture is far from ideal, it does give 
us a good starting point for the negotiation of power 
and culture. Here the Gramscian concepts of ideol-
ogy and hegemony come into play, in other words, 
the notion that the dominant ideas are the ideas of 
the ruling class. Given that ideology and hegemony 
are unstable factors, culture is “a terrain of conflict 
and struggle over meanings” (Barker 2000: 60-61). 
Popular culture is highly relevant when it comes 
to ideology and hegemony, as it is built upon what 
Gramsci calls “good sense” or a “cultural mindset” 
(Nachbar and Lause). The study of popular culture 
focuses less on the aesthetic value of an artifact and 
more on the cultural beliefs and values underlying 
it and how people react to it. It is easy to see the 
parallel between this neo-Gramscian conception 
of cultural studies and the vertical dichotomy of 
the people and the elite. This has been and is still a 
topic of interest in the study of populism (cf. Hall 
1985; 1986, Laclau 2005, Hart 2012). However, be-
fore looking into several examples of populist uses 
of culture, we need to analyse the mechanisms for 
creating a national identity on the basis of shared 
values and beliefs.
If, as Anderson states, we consider a community to be 
mainly culturally-based and if we interpret culture as 
the whole set of shared values and beliefs, then the 
question is how this applies to populist discourse. 
As discussed above, populism is a thin-centred 
ideology and is based on the three core concepts 
of the people, the elite, and the general will. I have 
claimed that the concept of a homogeneous people 
is inherently exclusive, and based on the principles 
of a common culture. This cultural component is 
therefore not limited to the far right but it is more 
explicitly expressed by parties with a strong nativist 
character, such as the Front National (FN) and the Partij 
voor de Vrijheid (PVV). Besides an alien ‘other’, seen as 
a threat to the people’s national culture, the elite is 
demonised for not being able or willing to stop the 
country losing its identity. In a speech at the Estivales 
de Fréjus [Fréjus Summer Festival] in September 20164, 
Marine Le Pen articulated the purely cultural bond 
between the French people: 
We are the French nation. Millions of us are linked 
by unseen, unbreakable bonds, united by love 
for our country, our language, our culture. The 
nation’s hearts beat as one, and we share the 
same breath, the same hope. (Marine Le Pen, 
18th September 2016)
Culture in this case is a tool to unite the people through 
common denominators. It is distinctive, because it 
allows the people to define themselves as French, and 
set themselves apart from other peoples (for instance, 
the British, the Germans). Not only is culture a way 
of defining the self but it is also quintessential of the 
people’s existence and its values: What is France if it is 
not a free, non-aligned nation that upholds the rights 
of each of the world’s peoples to choose their own 
destiny? (Marine Le Pen, 18th September 2016). The 
question is clearly rhetorical, highlighting the idea that 
 4 Discours de Marine Le Pen aux Estivales de Fréjus: 
https://www.rassemblementnational.fr/videos/discours-
de-marine-le-pen-aux-estivales-de-frejus/
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without the populist definition of culture, the notion 
of Frenchness is nothing but a hollow shell. A trans-
formation of the system of shared values and beliefs 
inevitably leads to a loss of the identification with - and 
thus distinctive function of - the culture, and even a 
detachment from the achievements of the democratic 
state such as Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. This is 
closely linked to the third and last implication of the 
populist definition of culture, namely its hegemonic 
character. According to the populists, other cultures, 
most notably non-European ones, are intrinsically 
backward; see the following quote by Geert Wilders 
during a Pegida5 meeting in Dresden, Germany6: 
“Our own culture is the best one. Immigrants should 
accept our values, not the other way around. (Geert 
Wilders, 13th April 2015). This ties in with the notion 
of Leitkultur — the leading culture of a country — that 
newcomers should assimilate (cf. Ossewaarde 2014). 
Interestingly, Wilders regards German and Dutch 
cultures as equally good, as they are both founded in 
the so-called Judeo-Christian tradition. He contrasts 
them with immigrant cultures, implicitly pointing to 
Islam, which threatens our allegedly superior Western 
European cultures. 
The examples above show how populist leaders argue 
that culture is not only unique to each people but also 
quintessential and strongly hegemonic. That said, it 
is still not clear how this translates into a populist 
cultural narrative. This issue will be the main focus 
of the following section.
THE POPULIST CULTURAL NARRATIVE
In order to distinguish between these ideas and tradi-
tions on the one hand, and specific products on the 
other, I shall use Huxley’s (1955: 17) terminology of 
 5 Acronym of Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation 
of The West), a far right-wing movement originally founded 
in Dresden (Germany) in 2014
 6 Pegida speech Geert Wilders, 13th April 2015: https://
www.pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/8286-speech-gw-
pegida-130415.html
sociofacts, mentifacts, and artifacts. The first two apply 
to what he calls social and mental constructions, such 
as kinship and political and economic institutions 
in the case of sociofacts, and symbols, rituals and 
beliefs for mentifacts. Examples of artifacts include 
buildings, tools, vehicles, and indeed anything that 
can be “classified according to the human needs and 
desires which they subserve – nourishment, health, 
shelter, clothing, enjoyment, adornment, commu-
nication, and so forth.”. In other words, whereas 
mentifacts include the shared values and beliefs of a 
certain culture, sociofacts are about how these ideas 
are reflected in visible, societal structures, whereas 
artifacts constitute the material productions of a given 
culture. For the purpose of this paper, the definition 
of artifacts will be narrowed down to artistic produc-
tions, as I am interested in those products that target 
our imagination and emotions. Figure 1 shows a 
schematic representation of this typology.
An example of a sociofact in both France and The 
Netherlands includes Judeo-Christian festivities, most 
notably Christmas. Both FN and PVV share the idea of 
the threat posed by a multicultural society, in which 
there is no longer any place for traditional religious 
festivities. A PVV member of parliament even speaks 
of a “cultural war against our identity.”7 The main 
idea is that by trying to be more inclusive towards 
non-Christian groups – for instance by calling Christ-
mas the “winterfeest” (winter feast), or Easter eggs 
“verstopeitjes” (‘Treasure Hunt’ eggs), the traditional 
Christian aspects, and thereby ‘our’ culture, are being 
lost. This idea of secularisation with the aim of more 
inclusion (or perhaps just more commercial success) 
is also present in France, and strongly linked to the 
presence of the traditional crèches de Noël (Nativity 
Scenes) in public places and their (in)compatibility 
with laicism. The FN considers these nativity scenes 
to be part and parcel of French culture and strives to 
maintain them in public buildings such as town halls, 
even though France’s lay principles and legislation 
forbid religious symbols in public buildings. 
 7 Zwarte Piet wet: https://www.pvv.nl/75-fj-related/harm-
beertema/9440-zwarte-piet-wet.html
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This idea of laicism, with its separation between State 
and Church, could be considered a mentifact, as it is 
an abstract value that is a key characteristic of French 
society. Institutionalised through the 1905 Act, this 
value took more specific form in the realm of sociofacts. 
However, it is important to note that it is not the 1905 
Act but rather the underlying belief in laicism (dating 
back to The French Revolution) that often sparks fierce 
debate. An example is the burqini [bikini-cum-burqua] 
ban on some French beaches in the summer of 2016, 
which led to the police forcing Muslim women to 
remove the garment. Yet discussions have also arisen 
in other countries about the compatibility of ‘our’ 
Western society and ‘their’ religious symbols (for 
instance, in The Netherlands, where laicism is not 
explicitly enshrined in Law). In 2009, Geert Wilders 
introduced the notion of kopvoddentaks, or ‘head rag 
tax’, a highly pejorative name for a tax that would 
apply to those wearing head scarves in public. In 
general, we can observe an equivocal interpretation 
of laicism. In the case of Marine le Pen, this translates 
into the rejection of the principles of French laicism 
when it relates to the presence of certain religious 
objects that are part of the Judeo-Christian tradition, 
such as the afore-mentioned nativity scenes. However, 
when talking about Islam, she is a fierce defender of 
laicism, willing to ban Muslim head scarves. This 
shows how the idea of ‘Identitarian Christianism’ (cf. 
above) works in practice. The basic idea is that ‘our’ 
Judeo-Christian feasts and traditions (and which are 
part of our (European) culture) are under constant 
attack by other ‘intolerant’ religions and cultures, 
whose influence should be kept at bay (cf. Wodak 
et al. 2013). 
An important feature that mentifacts and sociofacts 
have in common is the idea of the reappropriation 
of historical events, symbols or figures. This is in 
line with Renan’s (1882) analysis of what defines a 
people: “having common glories in the past and a 
will to continue them in the present; having made 
great things together and wishing to make them 
again.” This glorious past is constructed not only 
through recalling past glories but also by forgetting 
past disgraces. Renan considers the essence of a na-
tion is that “all of its members have a great deal in 
Figure 1
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common and also that they have forgotten many 
things.” The concept of forgetting implies practical 
issues, like belonging to an ethnic group (whose 
origins are buried in the mists of time) that forgets 
shameful historical events, such as colonial wars, 
or in Renan’s example, the St. Bartholomew’s Day 
Massacre. Closely related to forgetting is Hobsbawm’s 
notion of “invented traditions”; the construction of 
values and norms of behaviour, which are repeated 
and appear to be an unbroken continuation of the 
past (Hobsbawm 2012). In other words, a certain 
tradition (mentifact or sociofact) takes place regularly 
and exists presumably because things were done this 
way since time out mind. The problem lies not in 
the invented tradition but in the unshakeable (and 
mistaken) belief in its authenticity, the disregard of 
alternative pasts, and the idea that it must be fol-
lowed in its ‘pure form’ if one is to stay true to one’s 
culture. This, as we have seen above, makes invented 
traditions the playground of populist parties, claim-
ing that ‘others’ and the ‘elite’ want to destroy these 
cultural manifestations, and with them, most of the 
national culture. 
Anderson (2016: 210) underlines the importance of 
what he calls the emplotment of history, which is to 
say the creation of a historical narrative stressing 
an imagined fraternity, in which forgetting plays 
a crucial role:
“English history textbooks offer the diverting 
spectacle of a great Founding Father whom 
every schoolchild is taught to call William the 
Conqueror. The same child is not informed that 
William spoke no English, indeed could not have 
done so, since the English language did not exist 
in his epoch; nor is he or she told ‘Conqueror of 
what?’ For the only intelligible modern answer 
would have to be ‘Conqueror of the English’, 
which would turn the old Norman predator 
into a more successful precursor of Napoleon 
or Hitler.” 
This reappropriation of major historical events, figures 
or symbols is not only used to build the idea of a 
common national history but also to shape current 
challenges. To repeat Renan’s words, it is the will 
to continue the glories of the past in the present. 
These challenges are linked to the presence of the 
alien ‘other’, the horizontal dichotomy, and both 
FN and PVV insist on the threat that Islam poses 
to French and Dutch (Judeo-Christian) values and 
beliefs. Interestingly, when looking at the speeches 
of populist leaders, one can find many parallels 
with historical events involving an ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
dichotomy. 
Wilders refers to imperialism, calling Dutch citizens 
of Moroccan descent “colonists”8, speaking of a 
“sharia-infiltration”9 and hinting at the emergence 
of “Eurabia”10 during the final speech of his trial. 
Wilders also draws a historical parallel with Nazism, 
comparing The Koran to Mein Kampf,11 stating that 
The Koran contains even more anti-Semitism and 
appeals to hate and violence than Mein Kampf. New-
comer Thierry Baudet (Forum voor Democratie) refers 
to Nazism in a slightly more subtle way, that is to 
say, without mentioning it explicitly. He stresses the 
‘purity’ of civilisations, and warns against immigrants, 
who — according to him — are the reason for the 
“homeopathic dilution” or weakening of Western 
Civilisation. 
Wilders’ predecessor Pim Fortuyn, who was the first 
Dutch politician to openly question Islam and the 
multicultural society, was assassinated in 2002. He 
spoke of the fights against Islamic fundamentalism 
 8 Inbreng Wilders tijdens ABP: https://www.pvv.nl/12-in-de-
kamer/spreekteksten/1288-inbreng-wilders-tijdens-apb.
html








 11 Interview Geert Wilders in het AD: https://www.pvv.nl/36-
fj-related/geert-wilders/9336-interview-geert-wilders-in-
het-ad.html
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as ‘crusades’12, linking recent events to the mediae-
val religious wars. His column ends with the words 
“History repeats itself, time after time”. 
In France, Marine Le Pen has compared the immi-
gration crisis of 2015 to the barbarian invasions of 
the 4th century13, leading to the collapse of The Ro-
man Empire. She implied that action was necessary 
in order to prevent the barbarians from reaching 
France, presumably to stop The French Republic 
and its modern civilisation coming to a sticky end. 
The examples above show how a cultural narrative 
is constructed through a selection of mentifacts and 
sociofacts to stress the image of a powerful people 
versus an enemy in the present and near future. At 
the same time, this ‘enemy’ or ‘other’ is put in a much 
more negative light, using references to historical 
events bearing on the ‘us’ culture. The next part will 
discuss how artifacts contribute to the construction 
and confirmation of the populist narrative. 
Looking at artifacts, we should distinguish between 
those that were created to support a populist dis-
course and those that were not. Based on the notion 
of “the organic intellectual” (Gramsci 1971) (that is 
to say, someone who identifies with (and speaks in 
the name of) a given class), I will refer to the first 
category as ‘organic authors’ and the second as ‘ap-
propriated authors’. 
An example of an organic author that springs to 
mind when thinking of the Dutch case is a short 
film that was produced by Geert Wilders — Fitna 
(2008). The film is intended as a searing critique of 
Islam, showing fragments from The Koran next to 
footage of Islamic terrorism. Seeking to demonstrate 
 12 De geschiedenis herhaalt zich, keer op keer: http://www.
pimfortuyn.com/16-islamisering/388-de-geschiedenis-
herhaalt-zich-keer-op-keer





the threat Islam poses to The Netherlands, the film is 
a continuation of Wilders’ party programme, which 
seeks to ban Islamic influence. This harsh criticism of 
Islam and a strong defence of freedom of speech are 
perhaps what struck him when he read Oriana Fal-
laci’s work. Wilders claimed that it was after reading 
Fallaci’s The Force of Reason that he decided to found 
his own party14. He also won the Oriana Fallaci Free 
Speech Award in 2009. 
Another key event in Geert Wilders’ political career 
was the murder of Dutch film director Theo van Gogh 
after the release of his Islam-critical film Submission 
in 2004. This film and the killing of van Gogh are a 
special case meriting more detailed study. It seems 
that Van Gogh could qualify as an ‘organic author’ 
but at the same time his murder has been appropri-
ated by many others. The killing is a hot topic in 
the PVV and an important part of Wilders’ Fitna. 
Interestingly, the above-mentioned ‘literary populist’ 
Leon de Winter wrote the novel VSV (2012) on the 
reappearance of Van Gogh as a guardian angel. 
Two examples of French organic authors include Éric 
Zemmour and Renaud Camus. The former argued in 
his essay Le Suicide Français (2014), that mass (Muslim) 
immigration was leading to France losing its cultural 
identity and authenticity, hence the idea of a French 
suicide. This idea of cultural loss is put forward by 
Renaud Camus, author of Le Grand Remplacement in 
2011. He theorises that the native population will 
be reverse-colonised by Muslim immigrants, thus 
‘mutating’ the given country and its culture. An 
important aspect of this theory is the complicity of 
the political establishment at both the national and 
at the European level. With their generous immigra-
tion policies, driven by a supposed loathing of their 
native inhabitants, they would encourage people from 
Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa to move to Europe. 
Although this might sound a bit far-fetched — in 
fact, it was characterised as ‘complotiste’ (that is, as 
 14 Patriottische lente in Milaan: https://www.nrc.nl/
nieuws/2016/01/30/patriottische-lente-in-milaan-
1581420-a210117
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a ‘conspiracy theory’) by Marine Le Pen — Camus 
remains a source of inspiration for some PVV politi-
cians, whom he joined on a demonstration march 
in January 201815. 
The second category of authors (that is, the ‘appro-
priated authors’) is best illustrated by French writer 
Michel Houellebecq. His latest novel Soumission 
(2015), in which the Islamisation of France in the 
near future is depicted, was used by populist actors 
and right-wing journalists to underline the cultural 
dangers we are facing, linking them to the ideas of 
Zemmour and Camus. However, a deeper analysis 
of the novel and the author’s intentions reveals a 
different message. In fact, the novel is critical of 
the simplistic ‘good versus bad’ dichotomies char-
acterising the populist discourse (Jansma 2018). In 
other words, although the novel was not intended 
as right-wing populist propaganda (indeed, quite the 
opposite), it was appropriated as such by FN popu-
lists. This shows how a novel can become a part of 
a political strategy, in which it is used to promote 
a given worldview and a linked political agenda. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analysed the various ways in which 
populist actors in France and The Netherlands en-
gage with culture. Although populists often seem 
unenthusiastic about culture with a big ‘C’ (which 
they dismiss as “left-wing hobbies”  and argue that 
should not be subsidised by the tax-payer), the ap-
propriation of cultural products is ever-present in 
their discourse. Culture has the power to connect 
a people (an imagined community) on the basis 
of shared values and beliefs but also to draw sharp 
lines between ‘us’ and ‘them’. As such, a hegemony 
of cultures is constructed, which presupposes ‘our’ 
culture to be better than ‘theirs’. 
 15 Kasteelheer slaat alarm over cultuur van Europa: https://
www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/01/22/kasteelheer-slaat-alarm-
over-cultuur-van-europa-a1589332
I have looked at populists’ use and appropriation 
of culture. My purpose here was to come up with a 
typology of populism and culture. By first making 
the distinction between artifacts, mentifacts and 
sociofacts, one can get a more accurate idea of what 
‘culture’ means. I have shown that mentifacts and 
sociofacts are prone to: reappropriation; notions of 
memory and oblivion (Renan); invented tradition 
(Hobsbawm); emplotment (Anderson). All of them are 
key mechanisms that need to be taken into account. 
As far as artifacts are concerned, I have suggested 
two categories — organic authors and appropriated 
authors. In the latter case, the interpretation of the 
artifact often seems at odds with what the author 
intended. Here, deeper analysis of both artifact and 
its reception is needed to establish whether this is 
indeed the case. 
It should be said that any attempt to draw clear 
lines between artifacts, mentifacts and sociofacts 
is doomed to failure. While cultural categories are 
clear-cut, cultural products are often ambiguous and 
blur boundaries. Depending on the perspective, a 
cultural object could be both considered a mentifact 
and a sociofact. However, as we have seen above, we 
are interested not only in which kinds of cultural 
products make up the populist narrative but also 
how they are interlinked, and how they make up 
the whole populist narrative. 
More research is needed to ensure systematic investi-
gation of actual discursive practices of cultural appro-
priation. Specifically, this not only means analysing 
more cultural products but also scaling up analyses 
(for example, by using digital tools). Such an ap-
proach is needed to grasp how a variety of populist 
and non-populist actors engage with culture, and 
more precisely, which linguistic patterns and rhetori-
cal devices can be found (cf. Jansma 2018; Wodak 
2015). Not only will this give us the tools to decode 
the populist interpretation of cultural products but 
it will also reveal the importance of culture for the 
populist agenda. One hopes that such insights will 
lead to the building of a new, more inclusive cultural 
narrative.
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